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Making the Crime Fit the Punishment:
Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation
by Investigators Under the
Sentencing Guidelines
Andrew G. Deisst
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines")1 repre-
sent the culmination of a reform movement aimed primarily at
curbing judicial discretion in sentencing.2 Proponents argue that
the Guidelines strongly deter would-be drug offenders by ensur-
ing that criminals convicted of similar crimes receive similar
sentences? Critics, however, argue that the Guidelines merely
shift the locus of discretion from the courts to prosecutors.4 Ac-
cording to these critics, while inconsistency and injustice might
t B.A. 1986, Yale University; M.A. 1990, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1995,
University of Chicago.
The Guidelines were promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission
pursuant to Title 28, Section 994(a) of the United States Code on April 13, 1987. The
Guidelines did not take effect until November 1, 1987. See "Introduction," in United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov 1993) ("USSG").
2 The reform process was initiated by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
focused on three goals: (1) honesty in sentencing; (2) reasonable uniformity in sentencing;
and (3) proportionality in sentencing. While honesty in sentencing was thought to be
achieved through elimination of parole, the reformers believed that uniformity and pro-
portionality could only be secured through the reduction of the sentencing discretion of
judges. See USSG § 1A.3 (cited in note 1).
' See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st
Sess 37, 38-39, 65 (1983), which expressed the rationale in this way:
A sentence'that is unjustifiably high compared to sentences for similarly situ-
ated offenders is clearly unfair to the offender; a sentence that is unjustifiably
low is just as plainly unfair to the public.
S Rep No 98-225 at 45-46.
' Prosecutors have extraordinary discretion at virtually every stage of the prosecu-
tion. A prosecutor has authority to decide whether or not to investigate a crime. See Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence v Pierce, 786 F2d 1199, 1201 (DC Cir 1986). She may
also determine whether, when and where to bring charges, and what charges to bring. See
United States v Batchelder, 442 US 114, 123-25 (1979); United States v Goodapple, 958
F2d 1402, 1410-11 (7th Cir 1992); Fields v Soloff, 920 F2d 1114, 1118 (2d Cir 1990); Unit-
ed States v Brock, 782 F2d 1442, 1444 (7th Cir 1986). The courts have allowed prosecutors
full authority to decide whether to plea bargain, to grant immunity, or, in cases falling
within the Guidelines, to recommend a downward departure for cooperation. See United
States v Mohney, 949 F2d 1397, 1401 (6th Cir 1991); United States v Moody, 778 F2d
1380, 1385-86 (9th Cir 1985).
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diminish within the courtroom, they flourish behind the doors of
the United States Attorney's Office.'
Since Congress first passed the Guidelines, numerous schol-
ars have explored the effect of prosecutorial discretion under the
Guidelines, confirming in large measure the abuses and dangers
predicted by its critics.' Far less attention, however, has been
paid to the power of investigating agents to influence sentences
through pre-arrest manipulation.7 Nevertheless, judging from
case law and press accounts, pre-arrest sentence manipulation of
drug quantities and types by investigative officers appears to be
a growing problem.8
Consider the case of Michael Floyd Barth.' On seven differ-
ent occasions over a five-week period, Barth sold crack cocaine to
a government undercover agent. After the seventh sale, Barth
was arrested, charged, and convicted of distributing 50.4 grams
of crack, the aggregate amount of six of the seven sales.1" Be-
cause Barth had sold over fifty grams of crack, he faced a ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence. According to the district
judge trying the case, it was "not at all fortuitous that the agent
See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 117 FRD 459 (1988).
6 See, for example, Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U Pitt L Rev 393
(1992); Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U Chi L Rev 901, 925-928 (1991); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer,
A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S Cal L Rev 501, 501-03, 515-57 (1992).
See, for example, Eric P. Berlin, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Failure to
Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulation Before Arrest, 1993 Wis L
Rev 187, 205-14 (1993). While Berlin develops the problems of pre-arrest government
manipulation nicely, his proposed solutions to those problems, namely the expansion of
the defenses of sentencing entrapment and outrageous government conduct, are, as he
recognizes, somewhat limited. Id at 218-26.
8 A Lexis search of "sentencing entrapment" in the GENFED-OMNI file reveals no
cases in which the term was used before 1991. A search covering cases after 1991 uncov-
ers dozens. See, for example, United States v Overstreet, 5 F3d 295, 296-97 (8th Cir 1993);
United States v Shephard, 4 F3d 647, 648-50 (8th Cir 1993); United States v Barth, 990
F2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir 1993); United States v Rogers, 982 F2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir
1993), cert denied sub nom, Phillips v United States, 113 S Ct 3017 (1993); United States
v Stuart, 923 F2d 607, 609, 613-14 (8th Cir 1991); Baughman v United States, 1993 US
App LEXIS 11646, *2-4 (10th Cir 1993); United States v Monocchi 836 F Supp 79, 87-88
(D Conn 1993); United States v Franco, 826 F Supp 1168, 1169-71 (N D Ill 1993). See also
Robert L. Steinback, Sentencing Rules Distort Logic of Court System, Miami Herald 1B
(July 16, 1993).
United States v Barth, 788 F Supp 1055 (D Minn 1992), rev'd, 990 F2d 422 (8th Cir
1993).
"0 The jury acquitted Barth of the remaining charge. Id.
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arrested [Barth] only after he had arranged enough successive
buys to reach the magic number [fifty grams].""1
In an attempt to avoid a high mandatory minimum sentence,
Barth, like an increasing number of other criminal defendants
charged with drug offenses, asserted the defense of "sentencing
entrapment." 2 In United States v. Barth,3 the Eighth Circuit
became the first and only federal circuit court to recognize ex-
plicitly the existence of this defense, defining sentencing entrap-
ment as
outrageous official conduct [which] overcomes the will of
an individual predisposed only to dealing in small quan-
tities for the purpose of increasing the amount of drugs
* . .and the resulting sentence of the entrapped defen-
dant. 4
The court acknowledged that the defense of sentencing entrap-
ment had not been widely recognized, but it asserted that cases
like Barth's "are causing courts nationwide to rethink the long-
established rule of entrapment."15
Although sentencing entrapment, as defined by the Eighth
Circuit, applies only in cases where agents have manipulated the
drug amount, the defense could apply to other situations in
which defendants are induced to commit a crime carrying a stiff-
er sentence than the crime they were predisposed to commit. For
example, investigating agents can enhance a defendant's sen-
tence by manipulating the type of drug bought or sold or by link-
ing the transaction to an ancillary crime.
This Comment explores the problem of pre-arrest sentencing
manipulation, examines the solutions that have been proposed by
commentators and courts, and suggests that a court should afford
defendants a partial defense in cases in which, through pre-ar-
rest manipulation, investigating officers have acted in a particu-
lar manner for the purpose of enhancing a defendant's sentence.
Part I provides a typology of the common forms of pre-arrest
sentence manipulation. Part II examines the two primary ap-
proaches that defendants have pursued to seek redress for the
Barth, 788 F Supp at 1057.
12 The district court was persuaded by Barth's argument. See id. The Eighth Circuit,
however, was not convinced that the facts in Barth constituted sentencing entrapment.
See Barth, 990 F2d at 425.
" 990 F2d 422 (8th Cir 1993).
14 Id at 424, quoting Rogers, 982 F2d at 1245.
" See id.
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unjust consequences of pre-arrest sentence manipula-
tion-specifically the defenses of outrageous government conduct
and sentencing entrapment-and explores their shortcomings.
Part III concludes that a court should recognize a partial defense
in cases where the government has acted "for the purpose of"
enhancing the defendant's sentence through pre-arrest sentence
manipulation.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF PRE-ARREST SENTENCING MANIPULATION
Undercover agents can strongly influence the sentence a
drug offender receives by tailoring the circumstances of a crime
to fit certain categories under the Guidelines. Rather than ensur-
ing that the punishment fit the crime, agents can make the crime
fit the punishment by manipulating the amount and kind of
drugs exchanged and by involving ancillary crimes in the trans-
action. The following Section identifies the three most common
strategies that agents have employed to accomplish this goal: (1)
manipulation of drug amounts; (2) manipulation of drug type;
and (3) addition of ancillary charges.
A. Manipulation of Drug Amounts
Under the Guidelines, the "grade" of a drug offense is largely
determined by the quantity of drugs involved."8 Within the
Guidelines regime, undercover investigators have extraordinary
power to control the length of a criminal offender's sentence
through manipulation of the drug amounts bought or sold.
Judging from case law and press accounts, amount-based
sentence manipulation is increasingly common, 7 and patterns of
Guidelines-driven sentence manipulation have begun to emerge.
This development is not surprising, since police officers and fed-
eral agents are well aware of the Guidelines" and their intrica-
cies.19 In sting cases involving relatively small transactions,
18 See USSG §§ 2D1.1-2D3.5 (cited in note 1).
17 See note 7 and accompanying text.
18 See United States v Cabrera, 756 F Supp 134, 135-36 (S D NY 1991), vacated,
United States v Tejada, 956 F2d 1256 (2d Cir 1992) ("The existence of sentencing guide-
lines are [sic] well-known to police officers and federal agents and the impact of specific
evidence on the sentence a defendant will receive surely cannot have escaped their no-
tice.").
" The Sentencing Commission actively trains investigators across the country on
sentencing under the Guidelines. By 1991, the Sentencing Commission had trained over
4500 individuals on the workings of the Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Com-
mission, 1991 Annual Report at 28 (1991). Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the
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strikingly similar patterns of repeated buys and delayed arrests
suggest an investigative modus operandi.
The most common pattern is exemplified by the facts in
Barth. ° For example, in 1992, 35-year-old Angela Diane Reese,
a single mother and first-time drug offender, was arrested after
selling fifty-nine grams of crack to an undercover officer in seven
separate transactions.2' On May 5, 1993, she was sentenced to
twelve years in federal prison. After sentencing, Reese observed,
"there are people that murder, rape and kill who don't get that
much time."22
Pre-arrest amount-based manipulation, however, manifests
itself in various ways. For example, in United States v Rosen,3
the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") intercepted a
10,000 pound shipment of marijuana smuggled from Columbia.
Posing as smugglers, DEA agents delivered the shipment to drug
importer Michael Goldin. Goldin notified his customers that the
marijuana had arrived. He instructed them to drive to Maine and
deliver their vehicles and keys to him. Goldin then gave the keys
and the cars to "his" men who, unbeknownst to Goldin, were
DEA agents. According to Goldin's plan, these men were to drive
the customer's cars to a storage facility and load them with mari-
juana.24
One customer, Jay Martin Rosen, "negotiated, paid for, and
expected to receive" only thirty pounds of marijuana.25 When the
agents returned the car to Rosen, however, they informed him
that they had filled his car with 150 pounds of marijuana, gratis.
At sentencing, the full 150 pounds were used to calibrate Rosen's
base-offense level.2 Rosen's 150 pound "purchase" translated to
a fifty-one month prison stay.2" Had Rosen been convicted of
possessing merely the thirty pounds he sought to buy, his sen-
tence would have been between twenty-one and twenty-seven months."
Commission is authorized to "devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction
in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel and other persons connected
with the sentencing process." 28 USC § 995(a)(18) (1988).
20 990 F2d at 422.
21 See Steinback, Miami Herald at 1B (cited in note 8).
22 Id.
2 929 F2d 839 (1st Cir 1991).
24 Id at 841.
2 Id at 843.
Id at 841, 843.
2'7 Rosen, 929 F2d at 841, 843 n 7. See also USSG §§ 2Dl.l(c)(11), 5A (cited in note 1).
' USSG H8 2D1.1(c)(12), 5A (cited in note 1). See also United States v Stuart, 923
F2d 607, 610-11 (8th Cir 1991). In that case, the court rejected a sentencing entrapment
defense where the government "fronted" a kilogram of cocaine to the defendant, who
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B. Manipulation of Drug Type
Not only can investigators manipulate a defendant's sentence
by manipulating the amount of drugs exchanged, but they can
also enhance a defendant's sentence by selecting the type of
drugs to be bought or sold. Drug-type manipulation is a powerful
undercover weapon because, under the Guidelines, some drugs
carry far harsher penalties than others.29 For example, both
Reese and Barth were convicted of dealing crack cocaine. Had
they sold powder cocaine instead of crack, however, a five-kilo-
gram sale would have been necessary to yield the same sentence
as that they received for selling little more than fifty grams of
crack."
While neither Reese nor Barth argued that they had been
entrapped by the agent's choice of drug, other drug defendants,
such as Donald K. Shephard, have advanced this very argu-
ment.' For an eight-month period beginning in April 1988,
Shephard was the target of a sting operation conducted by Kan-
sas City undercover detective Mary Brown. Over that period,
Brown made twelve purchases from Shephard. In the course of
these transactions, she bought both powder cocaine and cocaine
that she asked Shephard to "rock"-to transform into crack co-
caine. At trial, the court rejected Shephard's argument that
Brown's request that he "rock" the cocaine constituted sentencing
entrapment. 2
C. Charge Manipulation
Undercover officers may also influence a defendant's ulti-
mate sentence by linking the drug transaction to ancillary
crimes. In Shephard, during the final stages of the investigation
Brown persuaded Shephard to accept food stamps in payment for
would have otherwise purchased less cocaine because of a lack of money. The informant,
who had pleaded guilty to a number of drug offenses, knew that he would not receive the
government's recommendation for a sentence reduction if he failed to convince the defen-
dant to purchase a full kilogram. Id at 610.
See, for example, USSG § 2D1.1(c) n 10 (cited in note 1).
o See id. See also 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988).
3, United States v Shephard, 4 F3d 647, 650 (8th Cir 1993).
32 Id. The court held that the argument was "not properly [a] sentencing entrapment
argument .... but rather [a] theor(y of entrapment on the elements of the crimes," and
this was an issue for the jury. Id. While the possibility for arbitrary application of the law
is great in both drug-amount and drug-type based entrapment, the latter category addi-
tionally contains a troubling systemic component: 92 percent of all federal crack defen-
dants are African-American; 72 percent of powdered cocaine defendants are not.
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the cocaine. At trial, Shephard argued not only that he had been
a victim of drug-type sentence manipulation, but also that under-
cover agent Brown had "[1]ured [him] into the [flood [s]tamp
[tirade [blusiness in [o]rder to [iincrease [his] [plunishment
[ulnder the Sentencing Guidelines.""
By orchestrating sting operations to follow specific Guide-
lines provisions, agents can exert dramatic influence on the ulti-
mate length of defendant's sentence. For example, an agent can
encourage a defendant to include a dangerous weapon in the
transaction. 4 She can also try to induce a drug sale within a
thousand feet of a schoolyard, thereby taking advantage of the
enhanced penalties under the "schoolyard statute."35
Agents can also secure lengthy convictions by inducing defen-
dants to enter into a conspiracy. Under the Guidelines, a drug
conspirator who does not complete or only partially completes a
planned transaction will be sentenced as if the object of conspira-
cy had been completed. 6 This rule potentially affords investigat-
ing agents significant power over the length of an individual
defendant's sentence37 because an undercover agent has full dis-
3 Shephard, 4 F3d at 649.
In United States v Overstreet, 5 F3d 295 (8th Cir 1993), the court upheld the ac-
tions of two undercover agents who traded two semiautomatic weapons to the defendant
in exchange for cocaine base, thereby utilizing the Guidelines' two-level 'dangerous weap-
on" enhancement. Id at 296. See also USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) (cited in note 1).
3' See United States v Noble, 1993 US App LEXIS 27062 (4th Cir 1993).
The Guidelines state:
If the offense involved both a substantive drug offense and an attempt or con-
spiracy (e.g., sale of five grams of heroin and an attempt to sell an additional
ten grams of heroin), the total quantity involved shall be aggregated to deter-
mine the scale of the negotiation offense. In an offense involving negotiation to
traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncomplet-
ed transaction shall be used to calculate the applicable amount.
USSG § 2D1.1 n 12 (cited in note 1).
"' In order to mitigate the potential for investigatory excess, Section 2D1.1 provides
that
where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not
reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude
from the guideline calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not in-
tend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing.
USSG § 2D1.1 (cited in note 1). The courts have not interpreted this provision uniformly.
First, the courts have disagreed over whether a sentencing judge must make specific find-
ings that the defendant intended to produce and was reasonably capable of producing the
negotiated amount. Second, the courts have divided on the issue of who bears the burden
of proving a defendant's intent and ability to produce the negotiated amount. See United
States v Christian, 942 F2d 363, 368 (6th Cir 1991); United States v Reyes, 930 F2d 310,
315 (3d Cir 1991).
Within this uncertain legal framework, in some jurisdictions undercover agents have
significant power to enhance a drug offender's sentence by convincing her to agree to sell
4191
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cretion to request as little or as much of a drug from the dealer
as she chooses. 8
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE DEFENSES OF SENTENCING
ENTRAPMENT AND OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT AS
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF PRE-ARREST SENTENCE
MANIPULATION
The crux of the problem of pre-arrest sentence manipulation
is not the issue of individual responsibility but of unequal imple-
mentation of the laws. For every Barth who was arrested after
his seventh sale of crack, several other defendants exist who
were arrested after their first sale; for every Shephard, asked to
"rock" powdered cocaine, others exist who were asked simply to
produce cocaine powder; and for every defendant asked to accept
food stamps as payment, thousands exist who were not. Unfortu-
nately, this wide range of outcomes represents exactly the type of
discretionary abuse that Congress hoped to eliminate with the
Guidelines.
When agents exercise complete discretion over the sentences
of defendants, the Guidelines' goal of uniform sentences is frus-
trated. Furthermore, even when agents are consistent in their
pre-arrest strategies, the results can be irrational: if officers
delay arrest long enough, every small dealer is a potential king-
pin.3
9
a large amount of drugs, even if the transaction never closes.
. United States v Smiley, 997 F2d 475 (8th Cir 1993), exemplifies this point. In Octo-
ber 1990, undercover officer Jon Ciarletti purchased heroin from Charles Smiley. Id at
477. Over the course of the next few months, Ciarletta began negotiations with Smiley to
purchase additional heroin. Id. During the course of those negotiations, Smiley explained
that his source was "transcontinental"; shortly thereafter he travelled to Thailand, visit-
ing a village known for its opium production. Id at 478. Upon his return, Smiley contacted
Ciarletta to find out how much heroin Ciarletta wished to purchase; Ciarletta responded
that he could "handle half of a case or a whole case." Smiley, 997 F2d at 478. Smiley
asked what Ciarletta meant by a case, and Ciarletta replied: "two point two." Id.
When a coup in Thailand made the delivery of the heroin impossible, Smiley was
arrested, charged, and convicted of, among other things, conspiracy to import heroin. Id.
He was sentenced at the base level established by the "two point two" language. Id at
480-81.
"9 The District Court for the Southern District of New York recently recognized that
strict application of the Guidelines could be irrational in situations in which the arrest of
a small-time dealer is delayed for a long period of time. In United States v Genao, 831 F
Supp 246 (S D NY 1993), the court held that the Sentencing Commision failed to consider
that a defendant who deals in small quantities over a long period of time is less culpable
than one who sells larger quantities; thus the court could depart from the Guidelines in
fixing Genao's sentence.
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The courts and commentators have only begun to wrestle
with the problems presented by pre-arrest sentence manipula-
tion.4" Defendants viewing themselves as victims of such manip-
ulation and hoping to avoid lengthy Guidelines-driven or manda-
tory minimum sentences have primarily relied on variations of
two defenses: (1) the defense of entrapment, and (2) the defense
of outrageous government conduct. This Part examines these de-
fenses and their limitations in the context of pre-arrest investiga-
tive sentence manipulation.
A. Entrapment Generally
The Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense
during prohibition in Sorrells v United States.4' In that case, an
undercover government agent visited an individual with whom he
had served in World War I and asked the defendant if he could
obtain some liquor. Twice the defendant refused to supply the
agent with liquor, but after conversation about shared wartime
experiences and a third request, the defendant finally acquiesced.
The defendant left his home and returned with a half-gallon of
whiskey. He was then arrested, charged, and convicted of vio-
lating the National Prohibition Act.42
The Sorrells Court split on the appropriate standard for
determining whether the defendant had been entrapped. The
majority favored the "subjective test," which focuses on the "pre-
disposition" of the defendant.43 Under this approach, in order to
invoke successfully the entrapment defense, a defendant must
show that he lacked the "criminal predisposition" to commit the
crime. The subjective test remains the federal standard, favored
by a majority of state courts."
The dissenters in Sorrells argued in favor of an "objective"
test, which disregards the defendant's predisposition and focuses
exclusively on the behavior of the law enforcement officers.45
The objective test asks whether the police behavior would have
been likely to induce a non-predisposed individual to commit the
, See Berlin, 1993 Wis L Rev at 205-06 (cited in note 7).
41 287 US 435, 452 (1932).
42 Id at 438.
See id at 444-45.
See Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobsen: Reflections on Six Decades of
Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 Wake Forest L Rev 829, 835
(1992).
41 See Sorrells v United States, 287 US 435, 448-59 (Roberts concurring).
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offense. 4' This approach has been adopted by some states,47 not
to mention several influential studies.48
While courts applying the subjective test have at times cited
numerous circumstances as relevant to predisposition,49 they
have generally determined predisposition on a case-by-case basis.
This ad hoc approach to establishing predisposition, coupled with
the deference generally shown to law enforcement by both judge
and jury, has limited the success of defendants who invoke the
entrapment defense.50
Despite the rare success of the entrapment defense in federal
courts, the defense has been a favorite of defendants seeking an
avenue to escape mandatory minimums and Guidelines-deter-
mined sentences, as well as a favorite of commentators and
courts concerned with investigative guideline manipulation."1
The weakness of the defense in traditional entrapment scenarios,
however, is exacerbated in the cases of "sentencing entrapment."
B. The Defense of "Sentencing Entrapment"
Only two circuits have explicitly taken a position on sentenc-
ing entrapment.52 In United States v Williams,53 the Eleventh
Circuit held that sentencing entrapment is not a viable defense.
According to the Williams court, sentencing entrapment did not
"survive" the Supreme Court's ruling in Hampton v United
States.' Though Hampton was not a sentencing entrapment
case,55 the Court nonetheless
, Id.
'7 These states include Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michi-
gan, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah,
and Vermont. See Bennett, 27 Wake Forest L Rev at 835 n 37 (cited in note 44).
48 See, for example, Model Penal Code § 2.13 (1985). See also Final Report of the Se-
lect Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice,
S Rep No 97-682, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 362 (1982); Final Report of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws: A Proposed New Federal Criminal Code § 702(2)
(1971).
" The courts have cited factors such as: (1) the character of the defendant; (2) wheth-
er the defendant herself suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant stood
to profit by the crime; (4) whether the defendant appeared reluctant to commit the of-
fense; (5) what inducement the government offered; and (6) the defendant's apparently
professional manner (language, criminal skills). See Bennett, 27 Wake Forest L Rev at
835 (cited in note 44).
'0 See Bennett, 27 Wake Forest L Rev at 835 (cited in note 44).
5 See, for example, Berlin, 1993 Wis L Rev at 230 (cited in note 7).
52 See United States v Barth, 990 F2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir 1993); United States v Wil-
liams, 954 F2d 668, 673 (11th Cir 1992).
954 F2d 668 (11th Cir 1992).
425 US 484 (1976).
85 In Hampton, the defendant was convicted of selling heroin supplied by the govern-
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ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment
could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a
case, such as this one, where the predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime was established.56
The Williams court thus read Hampton as denying the entrap-
ment defense to any defendant predisposed to commit a crime.
Only the Eighth Circuit has explicitly recognized the defense
of sentencing entrapment. In Barth, the district court found that
sentencing entrapment justified a downward departure from the
Guidelines in cases such as Barth's, where undercover agents
have "orchestrate[d] a defendant's sentence," 7 because the Sen-
tencing Commission had not adequately considered "the terrify-
ing capacity for escalation of a defendant's sentence based on the
investigating officer's determination of when to make an ar-
rest.""8 According to the court, the arresting officer was "un-
doubtedly aware" of the Guidelines provision that doubled the
defendant's sentence if the officer waited to arrest Barth until
Barth had sold over fifty grams of crack cocaine. 9
On review, the Eighth Circuit held that sentencing entrap-
ment can justify a Guidelines departure in cases of "outrageous
governmental conduct."6" The court concluded, however, that the
facts of Barth did not support a finding of outrageous government
conduct; unfortunately the court failed to specify what conduct
would meet such a standard.6
C. The Failure of the Defense of Sentencing Entrapment
According to the Eighth Circuit, a defendant arguing that
the sentencing judge should depart from the Guidelines due to
sentencing entrapment must show that she was "predisposed
only to dealing in small quantities" of drugs. 2 This formulation
gives rise to several problems.
ment. Id at 485. The trial court rejected the defendant's entrapment instruction, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling applying the subjective standard, which
requires an absence of predisposition on the part of the defendant. Id at 485, 488-89.
Id at 489.
"7 See United States v Barth, 788 F Supp 1055, 1057 (D Minn 1992). See also 18 USC
§ 3553(b) (1988).
788 F Supp at 1057.
Id, citing 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988).
60 Barth, 990 F2d at 424-25, quoting United States v Rogers, 982 F2d 1241, 1245 (8th
Cir 1993).
6' Barth, 990 F2d at 425.
62 Id at 424, quoting Rogers, 982 F2d at 1245.
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First, this standard requires a defendant to show that she
was not predisposed to selling amounts of drugs larger than
those involved in the transaction. Thus, as a matter of proof,
many future defendants will feel compelled to demonstrate small-
sale predisposition. A defendant in this position may need to rely
on her past criminal record or to confess to past small sales that
eluded criminal detection, thus raising serious self-incrimination
concerns. Furthermore, as a practical matter, it is unclear how
many previous transactions and of what size serve to establish a
predisposition to deal in smaller quantities of illicit drugs.'
Even where a defendant can demonstrate a predisposition to
sell only smaller quantities of drugs, a court might be influenced
by the reasons for this predisposition. For example, in Franco v
United States,' the defendant contended that undercover offi-
cers delayed his arrest until he had completed enough small
sales to elevate his sentence. The district court found that the
defendant, who had no prior record of arrest, was a small-time
dealer and addict who had suggested selling cocaine in small
quantities to a government undercover agent; the agent had
suggested the much larger sale. 5
Nevertheless, the district court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that he had demonstrated "substantial reluctance" to sell
the larger amount. Instead, the court found that the defendant
had been unable to obtain larger quantities in the past: "This is
not reluctance; this is inability, and it says nothing about wheth-
er Franco was predisposed to commit the crime for which he was
convicted.""6
' United States v Lewis, 987 F2d 1349 (8th Cir 1993), illustrates how problematic
the "predisposed to deal in lesser amounts" formulation may be. In Lewis, the defendant
was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine. Lewis argued that he was predisposed
to distribute only smaller quantities of cocaine; in an effort to demonstrate this predispo-
sition, he admitted to distributing one-pound quantities of cocaine on two occasions. In
addition, some evidence suggested that Lewis had transported three kilograms of cocaine
from Florida to Iowa. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that Lewis was predisposed to
conspire to distribute five kilograms. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the trial
court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
While the court's holding appears reasonable, this case reveals the difficulties of
line-drawing raised by the standard. For example, would the court's holding have been
clearly erroneous if the defendant had sold cocaine in one-, half-, or quarter-kilogram
amounts in the past?
826 F Supp 1168 (N D Il1 1993).
Id at 1170, quoting United States v Franco, 909 F2d 1042, 1045 (7th Cir 1990).
826 F Supp at 1170, quoting Franco, 909 F2d at 1045. In Franco, the court recog-
nized that a defendant's history of exclusively small-scale transactions is not particularly
probative of her predisposition toward engaging in future transactions. Small-scale sales
may well provide the "seasoning" necessary to commit larger crimes, or, as the court
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In addition, the Eighth Circuit's "predisposed to deal in less-
er amounts" formulation perversely fails to protect the first-time
offender. For example, in United States v Martinez-Hernandez,"
the court rejected the defendants' sentencing entrapment claim
on the grounds that "both [dlefendants presented defenses based
on claims that the incident at issue was their first encounter
with the narcotics trade,"88 and thus the defendants could not
establish predisposition for any amount other than the amount
involved in the transaction. This holding suggests that defen-
dants lacking criminal histories will be unable to establish a
predisposition to deal in smaller amounts and therefore will not
be able to invoke successfully the defense of sentencing entrap-
ment.
With respect to drug-type sentence manipulation, the ques-
tion of predisposition is even more problematic. While a dealer
may enjoy well-developed contacts for one product and not for
another, this "product loyalty" factor probably does not signify a
dealer's lack of predisposition to sell other narcotics. More signifi-
cantly, a defendant truly lacking predisposition to sell more "dan-
gerous" drugs would encounter very difficult problems of proof.
First, she would need to "prove a negative," such as the fact that
she had never sold more dangerous drugs in the past. Second,
she would need to proffer evidence that she was reluctant to
engage in such sales. Only in the rarest of cases would a defen-
dant be able to provide credible proof on this issue.
D. The Problem of Predisposition
Sentencing entrapment, to the extent that it relies on predis-
position, is ill-fitted to the vast majority of pre-arrest sentence
manipulation cases. First, defendants invoking the defense of
sentencing entrapment are admittedly predisposed to commit
drug crimes. Second, a defendant's claim that she was not predis-
posed to committing a particular drug crime, even if true, will be
difficult to prove, especially given such a defendant's lack of cred-
ibility.
Furthermore, by focusing solely on predisposition, a court
may overlook the important role that a government-afforded
opportunity can play in pre-arrest sentence manipulation cases.
found in Franco, a defendant may not have had the opportunity to make a larger sale
before contacting government officials. See id at 1171.
61 1993 US Dist LEXIS 1171 (N D Ill 1993).
Id at *6.
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In United States v Hollingsworth,69 Judge Posner, writing for
the majority, argued that entrapment exists when the govern-
ment provides a criminally predisposed individual with a crimi-
nal opportunity she would otherwise never have had.7" Accord-
ing to Judge Posner, "[a] person who had dreams of criminali-
ty.. . but no means of living them would be harmless and must
be left alone."'"
Though the Seventh Circuit asserted that its holding had "no
implications at all for the garden-variety drug cases in which the
defense of entrapment is most frequently, but futilely, raised,"72
the logic of its holding directly applies to a defendant's claim of
sentencing entrapment. Surely hundreds of small-time drug deal-
ers will never meet a large buyer. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's ra-
tionale should apply equally to the defendant who, without a
government-afforded opportunity, would never have gained the
opportunity to consummate a large sale.
Finally, the concept of predisposition is not meaningful if
drug crimes are viewed as rational, self-interested acts. Defen-
dants asserting the defense of sentencing entrapment are, by
admission, criminally predisposed. They have already demon-
strated their willingness to break the law for personal advantage.
They have thus balanced perceived risks and benefits on the
basis of all available information.
This fact is the cornerstone of the sting scenario. Govern-
ment agents expend an enormous amount of time and effort to
"go undercover" and "get inside" through misrepresentation pre-
cisely for the purpose of gaining the dealer's confidence. Agents
know that once a criminal actor satisfies himself as to the crimi-
nal "integrity" of the agent, the dealer will complete the transac-
tion. Indeed, given the dealer's criminal predisposition, the dealer
would be behaving irrationally if he chose not to complete the
deal.
This argument asserts more than the mere fact that every
small dealer would rather be a large one. It stresses that the
government's success in undercover operations probably stems
more from a criminal's gullibility than his culpability. In a sen-
tencing entrapment scenario, it makes little sense for a court to
inquire into the morality of the defendant; the defendant's moral-
6' 9 F3d 593 (7th Cir 1993).
70 Id at 593.
71 Id.
72 Id at 601.
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ity or lack thereof has already been established. In cases of pre-
arrest manipulation, the inquiry should instead scrutinize the
discretionary behavior of law enforcement officers.
Ultimately, the error of focusing on the issue of predisposi-
tion is that it bears little relevance to the problems associated
with sentence manipulation, such as unwarranted investigative
discretion. In the search for answers to the difficult problem of
pre-arrest sentence manipulation, the concept of a defendant's
predisposition should not be the key.
E. The Failure of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense
As an alternative to the defense of sentencing entrapment,
some commentators have argued that a court should recognize
the "outrageous government conduct" defense in cases of pre-
arrest sentence manipulation.73 The Supreme Court first sug-
gested the defense in United States v Russell:74
While we may some day be presented with a situation
in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely
bar the government from invoking judicial process to
obtain a conviction'. . . the instant case is distinctly not
of that breed .... The law enforcement conduct here
stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice," mandated by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.75
The attractiveness of this defense for victims of pre-arrest
sentencing manipulation is that, at least in theory, even defen-
dants who are criminally predisposed can utilize the defense of
outrageous government conduct. In Hampton, five Justices
agreed with Justice Powell's suggestion that the outrageous gov-
ernment conduct defense could be utilized by predisposed defen-
dants when police behavior has exhibited "a demonstrable level
of outrageousness."76
7s See, for example, Berlin, 1993 Wis L Rev at 226 (cited in note 7).
4 411 US 423 (1973).
7 Id at 431-32 (citations omitted).
7' Hampton, 425 US at 495 n 7. However, Justice Powell wrote that it would be "es-
pecially difficult to show [outrageousness] with respect to the contraband offenses, which
are so difficult to detect in the absence of undercover involvement." Id.
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In developing a test for outrageousness, the Supreme Court
invoked Rochin v California,77 a case in which police officers
pumped the stomach of a defendant who had swallowed mor-
phine capsules in an effort to conceal evidence of his guilt. In
Rochin, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction, stating
that the officer's behavior did "more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime
too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. " "
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Russell,79
and Justice Powell in his concurrence in Hampton,0 applied the
Rochin "shock-the-conscience" standard to cases of governmental
misconduct.
The defense of outrageous government conduct may exist
only in theory. Only very rarely have the circuit courts found
circumstances sufficiently outrageous to establish the defense. 1
Thus, it is extremely unlikely that a court would extend the out-
rageous government conduct defense to the sentencing phase. It
is equally unlikely that the typical pre-arrest sentence manipula-
tion case would exceed the "shock-the-conscience" threshold. The
majority of pre-arrest sentence manipulation cases have followed
what have become standard sting scenarios," which do not
shock the conscience. Thus, the defense of outrageous govern-
ment conduct, like sentencing entrapment, ultimately fails to
address the evils of pre-arrest sentence manipulation.
III. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF PRE-
ARREST SENTENCE MANIPULATION
A court could partially remedy the problem of pre-arrest
sentence manipulation through liberal use of departure power.
Under Title 18, Section 3553(b) of the United States Code, a
sentencing court has the authority to depart from the Guidelines
if it finds
" 342 US 165 (1952).
7 Id at 172.
7' Russell, 411 US at 432. Chief Justice Rehnquist seems subsequently to have dis-
avowed this idea in Hampton, 425 US at 488-89.
'o Hampton, 425 US at 491.
sI In United States v. Twigg, 588 F2d 373 (3d Cir 1978), the Third Circuit allowed the
defense in a case where, acting through an informant, the prosecution planned, financed,
and established a drug manufacturing operation in order to draw in the defendant as part
of the plan.
2 See Saul M. Pilchen, The Underside of Undercover Operations, Legal Times 39
(July 15, 1991).
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an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guide-
lines that should result in a sentence different from
that described. 3
Both the text of the Guidelines and its legislative history suggest
that the Sentencing Commission did not adequately contemplate
its applicability to government sting operations.' Moreover, in
adopting the Guidelines, Congress expressly intended to address
the problem of discretionary sentencing. By shifting discretion
from judges to investigators, pre-arrest sentence manipulation
directly contravenes congressional intent.
In light of these realities, sentencing judges could depart
from the Guidelines when the government, through orchestration
of -events surrounding a defendant's arrest, has attempted to
manipulate a defendant's sentence. On the other hand, liberal
departure in such cases will not remedy pre-arrest manipulation
that takes advantage of mandatory minimum sentences. Thus, a
court should recognize a partial defense, thereby addressing both
Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentence manipulation. A
court must determine when the defense should apply. This Com-
ment examines three possible standards: the "reasonable" agent
or investigator standard; the "target" approach; and a test that
evaluates the agent's intent.
A. The "Reasonable Investigator" Standard
A court could require that an investigating agent's pre-arrest
behavior must be "reasonable." The principal strength of this
approach is its flexibility. It affords a court the discretion to con-
sider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the undercov-
er operation. Unfortunately, this strength doubles as a weakness.
The standard resurrects discretionary sentencing in the judiciary,
which is precisely the problem that Congress sought to eliminate
with the passage of the Guidelines.
Futhermore, such a test may not enhance the protection that
is now available. A narrow definition of "reasonable" investiga-
tive behavior may be indistinguishable from the narrow funda-
mental fairness and outrageous government conduct defenses.
Thus, a vague "reasonableness" standard would not represent an
' 18 USC 3553(b) (1988).
" See Pilchen, Legal Times at 39 (cited in- note 82).
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adequate judicial response to the problem of sentencing entrap-
ment.
B. The Target Approach
In Barth, the undercover officer stated that after the fourth
of seven buys, "his main purpose was to 'get to the source.
Based on this testimony, the district court found that "buys five
through eight were for an investigatory purpose unrelated to the
apprehension of this defendant," and thus the court excluded
these transactions from the base offense level calculations." The
court considered only those drug amounts exchanged while the
defendant was the "target" of the investigation.
This "target" approach works best when applied by a court
scrutinizing large-scale undercover operations focused on expos-
ing entire drug operations. The test does not compel investigators
to damage network relationships prematurely in order to make
arrests, and in some situations the standard limits the unjust
sentencing effects of undercover operations.
Yet the target standard ultimately falls short because it fails
to provide for adequate judicial review of investigative discretion:
it does not inquire into how a target was chosen, how long a
defendant can legitimately be targeted, or for what crimes a
defendant may be targeted. Furthermore, the target approach
does not provide a defense when an individual is singled out, not
as part of a larger ring, but in order to test the parameters of the
individual's criminality. Finally, the target approach only works
in cases of drug-amount manipulation; it does not address the
problems presented by drug-type or charge manipulation.
C. The Intent Standard
In Barth, the Eighth Circuit recognized sentencing entrap-
ment when outrageous government conduct has overcome the
will of a defendant "for the purpose of increasing ... the result-
ing sentence."87 This Comment advocates that a court should
depart from the Guidelines whenever an agent has acted "for the
purpose" of increasing a defendant's sentence under the Guide-
lines.
" Barth, 788 F Supp at 1058.
Id.
7 990 F2d at 424, quoting Rogers, 982 F2d at 1245.
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Had the district court in Barth employed a standard that
tested the officer's intent to manipulate Barth's sentence, drug
buys two through four would have been disallowed for sentencing
purposes because the buys were made for the purpose of enhanc-
ing the defendant's sentence; by contrast, buys five through
eight, made with another target in mind, would have been al-
lowed. In short, the court would have reached the exact opposite
result.
While this result may seem somewhat arbitrary, the "for the
purpose of" test specifically prohibits agents from targeting an
individual and intentionally enhancing her sentence. In such
situations, the agent's intent is relevant more to the sentence a
defendant receives than to the culpability of the defendant. De-
scribed in terms more in accordance with the focus of the Guide-
lines, in cases of pre-arrest sentence manipulation the govern-
ment may have caused more harm to society than did the defen-
dant.
At the same time that the intent standard prevents sentence
manipulation for the purpose of punishment enhancement, it
does not interfere with undercover operations, and it does not
excuse a defendant for the harm she caused during the part of
the undercover operation not designed to maximize her sentence.
By focusing on the government actor rather than the criminal
defendant, the intent test also avoids the difficulties of predispo-
sition. Finally, it is equally applicable to amount-based, drug-
type, and ancillary-charge-based forms of pre-arrest investigative
sentence manipulation.
This standard may have already begun to develop in the
district courts. The "for the purpose of' language has surfaced in
some recent circuit court opinions. For example, the Shephard
court stated that the Guidelines create potential "situations in
which the government engages in undercover or sting transac-
tions for the sole purpose of ratcheting up a sentence under the
guidelines."88
The "for the purpose of' approach is not without weaknesses.
It does not fully eliminate the dangers posed by investigative dis-
cretion. Agents can still choose targets and, within broad limits,
determine for which crimes those suspects are targeted. Nonethe-
less, defendants viewing themselves as victims of pre-arrest sen-
tence manipulation would be able to question the undercover
operative on the stand in the hope of showing that the officer
' United States v Shephard, 4 F3d 647, 649 (8th Cir 1993).
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acted for the purpose of enhancing the defendant's sentence.
Although in many cases defendants would encounter difficulty
carrying the burden of persuading a court of an officer's illegiti-
mate intent, the principle established by the test is sound. In any
case, this approach affords a more practical and equitable remedy
than that now available, and it limits investigative discretion
without destroying undercover operations.
CONCLUSION
In the current war on drugs, investigating agents possess
powerful weapons to combat drug crimes. In organizing undercov-
er operations, law enforcement officers possess extraordinary
power to control a criminal defendant's sentence by orchestrating
the circumstances surrounding a crime, thereby taking advantage
of the inflexible sentences established under the Guidelines and
the mandatory minimums. The potential for discretionary excess
is great. By comparison, those defendants who are victims of pre-
arrest investigative sentence manipulation are poorly armed,
having at their disposal two ill-suited defenses: the defense of
sentencing entrapment and the defense of outrageous govern-
ment conduct.
This Comment contends that a court should depart from the
Guidelines when government agents conduct a sting operation
"for the purpose of' increasing a defendant's criminal- sentence.
While this approach would not eliminate the dangers of unbri-
dled investigative discretion, it would provide a versatile and
meaningful check on the infantrymen of the War on Drugs.
